Introduction
This chapter investigates the relationship between Islamism and neoliberalism in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab uprisings in the Middle East focusing on the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP, the Muslim Brotherhood's political party) in Egypt and the Nahda movement in Tunisia. Through the analysis of the two movements, I seek to contribute to the broader discussion, in this volume, on neoliberalism, the concept of "governmentality," and the future of the state in the Middle East following the 2011 Arab uprisings.
The access to power that the FJP and Nahda at least partially achieved following the overthrow of the Hosni Mubarak and Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali regimes gave them the opportunity to apply some of their ideas and policies or at least to propose specific policies in response to concrete circumstances. Their words and actions showed that the FJP and Nahda are comfortable with neoliberal structures and do not aim to challenge or transform them in any fundamental sense-in other words, that Islamism cannot, in these cases, be regarded as an antisystemic force. The chapter argues that Islamists' approaches to neoliberalism are shaped by the history of each movement and the evolving political and socioeconomic context in which they operate. It proposes that the Muslim Brotherhood/FJP's and Nahda's changing class support basis have rendered them readier to defend the neoliberal policies and structures that had been previously promoted by the Mubarak and Ben Ali regimes. However, the neoliberal tendencies of the movements were considerably tempered by their need to retain-in the context of worsening postuprising economic conditions-broader political support through promoting 2 of 33 "social justice," which had been a key popular demand of the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia.
This was not in the context of a radical restructuring of the economy but with a view to balancing the interests of their middle-class supporters with those of the poorer segments of the population.
The history of neoliberalism in the Middle East has been a checkered one. Cronyism and corruption have undermined and even invalidated neoliberal reforms, accentuated their (already high) costs, and prevented the region from enjoying many of their potential benefits. The enormous socioeconomic discontent in the Middle East region was a central-though not the only-reason for the 2011 uprisings. What we see, however, at least in the case of Egypt and Tunisia, is that Islamist movements that did not challenge neoliberalism-the "existing economic paradigm," in the words of Emel Akçalı in the Introduction of this volume-were voted into power immediately after the overthrow of existing regimes.
Akçalı proposes two possible ways of explaining this apparent paradox. On the one hand, we can do so using Michel Foucault's idea of "neoliberal governmentality," whereby subjects are disciplined into docility by the exigencies of "the market" while having only the illusion of being "free" and responsible agents. Alternatively-and more convincingly, in her view-we can interpret the postuprising developments in the Middle East in a more subtle manner: as one instance of an "interaction of neoliberal rationality with the local [in this case, the Middle East and North Africa]" producing "new forms of subjectivities, hybrid identities, transformed structures, resistances that arise against or as a result of such governmentality techniques" [Akçalı, Introduction] . The present chapter provides empirical material for the reader to address these theoretical questions and investigate more deeply the volume's core conceptual concerns.
Islamist Approaches to Capitalism, Charity, and Social Justice
Islamism is not a class-based political ideology. It denounces the divisiveness entailed in "class" 3 of 33 while calling for "justice" for society in its totality. Socioeconomic concerns and demands are some of the most important components of Islamism across the board. This is where our ability to generalize about Islamism ends, however. Islamism is, in fact, fluid and malleable in its approach to socioeconomic issues and appeals variously to different social groups. Islamist movements comprise a multitude of different trends that constantly evolve, so much so that referring to them as part of a single phenomenon becomes, at times, unsustainable and unconvincing. Furthermore, Islamists are not drawn from any one particular class (Kurzman and Naqvi 2010).
Islamism and Islamists are not inherently pro-or anticapitalism (see also Tripp 2006) . In the post-1970s retreat from the statist-led model of development in the Middle East, which coincided with the ascendancy of Islamism in the region, "in contradictory ways, Islamism appeals to both the losers and the winners of global neoliberal economic restructuring" (Beinin 2005, p. 113) . In Beinin's words, Islamism "may be systemic or anti-systemic. In the era of neoliberal economic restructuring, it has been both simultaneously" (Beinin 2005, p. 116) .
One reason for the rise in popularity of Islamist movements of all hues in the Middle East after the 1970s was their social activism. Insofar as we can see Islamism as the product of failed developmentalism (linked with authoritarianism) and modernization programs gone awry (Rahnema 2008), socioeconomic concerns are at the root of the phenomenon itself. Social activism has typically been an aspect of dawa (missionary) activities of Islamist movements but was also a means of implementing their broader ideological demands for social justice, which resonate with traditional Islamic terminology (Ruthven 1997; Kung 2007) .
Islamist movements of a radical and often violent type, pursuing a variety of objectives that included social justice, emerged in a number of Arab countries after the 1970s and were 4 of 33 particularly active and prominent in the 1990s. The 1979 revolution in Iran was partly caused by economic discontent and the Islamic Republic initiated policies of considerable wealth redistribution. Although the causes of Islamic radicalism are more complex, there has been an association between Islamic radicalism and economic deprivation (Ibrahim 1980 (Ibrahim , 1995 see also Kurzman and Naqvi 2010, pp. 138-39) , though this was not limited to the grievances or aspirations of any one class. Rahnema points to the many different social groups comprising the supporters of radical Islamist movements 1 (Rahmena 2008, p. 494) ; he, and Beinin, emphasize the support given to radical groups by the salaried middle classes and the "lumpen intelligentsia," university graduates who-following the economic turn in the post-Nasser erasaw their prospects considerably worsen (Beinin 2005, pp. 123-28) . However, only one strand in the broader phenomenon of "Islamism" is associated with economic deprivation and radical socioeconomic demands (see also Tripp 2006, chs. 3, 5) .
More often than not, Islamist activists' provision of social services in the post-1970s
Middle East did not entail an antisystemic stance. Islamist groups delivered health and education services and often simply foodstuffs and money to the poorer strata (Harrigan and El-Said 2008) .
Islamic charities and welfare associations were also run by and for the middle classes, offering them vital medical and instruction facilities at relatively low cost (Clark 2004 would argue, justice means everyone being given "their due": in a just order, individuals and social groups coexist with one other in a complementary and nonconflictual manner (very much as members of a family should do, in the Islamist worldview). As we saw above, despite some exceptions of radical groups, altering socioeconomic structures with the aim of promoting equality has not been at the heart of Islamist projects. Charity plays a key role in the maintenance of these structures and it is seen as a key expression of dedication to God. However, the "pious neoliberal"-and herein lies the new development-does not believe in passing handouts to the needy but seeks to turn the individual into a responsible and entrepreneurial "subject" (Atia 2012). Pious neoliberalism has moved away from the idea that social justice is something to be implemented "from above," by God or the state or even the Islamist group, in favor of the notion that, with God's blessing of course, the individual himself or herself will attain the position they deserve. In pious neoliberalism, "justice" is the attainment of the individual's potential as a result of his or her own efforts-a principle that lies at the heart of neoliberalism more broadly.
The phenomenon of pious neoliberalism is more advanced in Turkey because of the specific circumstances of that country, in particular the emergent socioeconomic realities 
The Economic Policies of the Freedom and Justice Party
It should be clear from the above discussion that the Muslim Brotherhood and its political party, the FJP, is only one strand in a broader Islamist movement in Egypt. It constitutes the focus of this chapter, however, first because it was the most important Islamist actor following the 2011 uprising and, second, because its acquisition of power in that period, partial though it was, presents us with a rare opportunity to observe the implementation of Islamist principles, as opposed to their enunciation in the abstract. It is not the place here for yet another discussion of the causes of the Egyptian uprising.
Suffice it so say that socioeconomic demands were equally important to political demands in driving the rebellion. Protesters called for "dignity"; they claimed freedom and accountability, if The Brotherhood did not take a leading role in the 2011 Arab rebellion, joining it, rather, alongside other political forces. However, Islamist groups were the main beneficiaries of political change, at least in its immediate aftermath. Arguably, it was not the Islamists'
propositions for economic change that brought about their electoral successes. Although economic discontent had been a core reason of the uprising, the economy was not at the forefront of the campaign and coalitions formed around identity politics, not economic policy (Kinninmont 2012, pp. 1, 3). This did not indicate that economic issues were unimportant but that the electorate saw moral uprightness as the "solution" to economic problems: The Islamists sent the message that, because they were morally "righteous"-good Muslims-they would be able to deliver better governance. Masoud (2014) makes the equally plausible argument that the Brotherhood/FJP succeeded in the polls because the Egyptian electorate, and the poorer classes in particular, believed that they-in contrast to their leftist rivals-would distribute wealth. 14 However, while it made efforts to satisfy its business constituency, the FJP was loath to alienate its poorer and more disadvantaged supporters. It tried to keep them on its side by continuing "to play the identity card to defend Morsi's decisions, even if they were irrelevant to religious concerns" (El Houdaiby 2013, p. 11).
It prevaricated on the IMF deal because its resultant reduction of subsidies would have flown in the face of the Egyptian uprising's popular demands for social justice and the public's aversion to neoliberal policies. Stuck in the middle, in the constrained context of deteriorating economic conditions, the FJP brought upon itself the worst of both worlds.
The Economic Policies of Nahda
The Tunisian uprising of late 2010 to early 2011 was, perhaps more clearly than others in the region, the result of relative deprivation-as opposed to absolute poverty-which deepened popular grievances and caused an eruption. At the forefront of the rebellion were both those who felt that their living standards were falling or not rising in line with their expectations and, particularly, those hailing from the disadvantaged regions of the country's south and the interior, where average rates of poverty were four times higher compared to those in the richer coastal areas. The mass protests in Tunisia also targeted the kleptocracy that had formed around Ben Ali and his family. All in all, grievances about the economy, lack of political freedoms, failures in governance, and corruption were the main reasons behind the rebellion, with the first (economic grievances) being slightly more significant (World Bank 2014, p. 27).
The Tunisian Islamist movement, Nahda, had been banned under Ben Ali and-similarly to the Brotherhood in Egypt-was not at the forefront of the uprising that overthrew him.
However, it quickly regrouped following its legalization and contested the elections of October In its first months, the Nahda-led government tried to preserve a balance between a probusiness agenda and attention to social justice, which inevitably led to tensions. Its economic policy plans and objectives were deemed to be similar to the old regime's but there was also an attempt to ensure benefits were more evenly distributed among the population, as well as a push for good governance and anticorruption measures (EIU January 2012, pp. 5, 7). For example, in a speech to the Constituent Assembly on December 22, 2012, Prime Minister Jebali promised job creation but also that the government would be business-friendly. He also promised transparency in financial transactions and announced that the government was drawing up the legal framework to encourage Islamic banking and finance (EIU January 2012, pp. 13-14; March 2012, p. 13 ).
The government announced its priorities as consisting of job creation, regional development, human rights, and good governance (EIU January 2012, p. 11). It tried to stimulate the economy through high spending. The 2012 budget increased social spending by 7.5 percent, to fund infrastructure in the interior and a rising public sector wage bill (EIU January 2012, pp. 6, 16) .
At the same time, Nahda reassured foreign investors that pursuing foreign direct investment would remain a key economic policy (EIU January 2012, p. 6). To ease the situation and help the economy, the government drew up and introduced a 120-page "middle of the road" action plan, developed in collaboration with the UGTT and the employers' association, UTICA (EIU April 2012, p. 11).
The tensions within the government over issues of economic policy and between a probusiness and a social justice agenda continued. The Central Bank governor was sacked, over differences over the rise of interest rates: He wanted to lift them to keep inflation down, but the government wanted to avoid dampening growth. The finance minister, one of the few independents in the government, resigned, complaining that government spending was excessive and unsustainable and that it was not reaching those who needed it most; he also expressed 24). The Nahda-led government tried to obstruct the UGTT's initiatives and used repressive and intimidatory tactics against workers ' protests (Paciello 2013, pp. 26-27 ). Nahda's leaders "never miss a chance to call for more capital, stimulation of the private sector and engagement in economic partnership that is based on international free market principles" (Al-Anani 2012). On the other hand, Nahda's economic platform emphasized economic justice (Paciello 2013, p. 19) and the government it led did make an effort to cater to the needs of the lower classes and the country's poorer regions (Habibi 2012) . It appeared to rely on the state in generating employment and investment (Saif and Abu Rumman 2012). The Nahda-led government pursued an expansionary budget policy, which translated into a rising subsidies and the public sector wage bill (World Bank 2013); it also presided over an increase in public employment (Dworkin 2014, p. 3) . 18 This was a particularly difficult balancing act to maintain in a period of economic downturn and turmoil, however, and presumably contributed to Nahda's loss of popularity and electoral support in the October 2014 parliamentary election, where the party lost a number of its seats and came second to the recently formed, anti-Islamist Nidaa Tounes.
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Conclusion
The economic policies of the Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt and of Nahda in Tunisia in the post-2011 setting were situated within a broader discussion of Islamism and neoliberalism in the Middle East region and in particular the emergence of "pious neoliberalism." The records of the two groups show that the groups were comfortable with a neoliberal agenda and that they were unwilling to challenge the socioeconomic structures of the countries they came (at least in part and for a time) to rule. This sat uneasily with the demands for social justice put forward during the uprisings that overthrew the regimes of Mubarak and Ben Ali. To meet this challenge, the two movements tempered their neoliberal agendas by desisting from harsh measures that would further punish popular strata already suffering from the negative economic consequences of political turmoil. This was the result of the pragmatic need to satisfy their mixed constituencies and hang on to the power they had so unexpectedly achieved.
Following the uprisings, the FJP and Nahda realized, as did Islamist groups elsewhere, that they had to deliver in adverse conditions, namely in the economic crises that had gripped their countries in the post-2011 context (Habibi 2012). In doing so, they were mindful of trying to balance their middle-class and lower-class constituencies. They tried to give moral and ethical considerations a prominent place in the economy and occupy a centrist position between socialism and capitalism (Saif and Abu Rumman 2012). They attempted to balance between individual and public interest. In both Egypt and Tunisia, interim governments, which Islamists dominated or participated in, increased government spending and domestic borrowing. The result was higher government deficits and inflationary pressures. But these populist policies were not due to antineoliberal preferences but because Islamist groups were seeking to retain their positions in power.
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The post-2011 records of Freedom and Justice and Nahda show that, if we understand "system" as the fundamental socioeconomic structures in Egypt and Tunisia, these Islamist actors cannot be considered antisystemic forces (Secor 2001) . Taking a step back, we can see that the uprisings in these two countries did not alter these structures (see also Kienle and Ettinger 2014), although they did remove the predatory circles that had formed around their respective presidencies. Islamists took positions of power fairly soon afterward but they did not show any serious intention of interfering with the fundamentals of the established socioeconomic order (although they were, of course, part of the wave that had overthrown the preexisting political order). What they aimed for, at least in the case of Egypt, was a change of personnel:
They would want their supporters to benefit from new opportunities and the business people associated with their movement to take over positions of economic control. What the Islamists sought, in other words, was a change of elites within the preexisting socioeconomic structures, which had otherwise remained intact.
